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Abstract 
Advocates of lean production argue that a work system is truly lean only if a given bundle of 
practices, including worker empowerment, is implemented in the proper configuration. In 
contrast, my interviews and observations in six US manufacturing plants demonstrate that 
substantive empowerment is not a necessary condition for achieving a lean manufacturing system 
that yields considerable performance improvement. While many configurations I observe appear 
to be ‘lean enough’ for satisficing managers, one commonality among the cases observed here is 
that worker empowerment is limited in depth and breadth. Employee involvement may be limited 
in depth because substantive empowerment requires a change in organizational routine and 
authority structure not necessary to achieve the largely technical goals of management. Even 
when an employer embarks on major technical and social change, pushing beyond lean enough 
toward world-class organization, substantive empowerment is limited in extent due to the 
demands of standardization and managerial prerogative, as well as resistance and reticence 
among workers. 
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1. Introduction 
Like other post-Fordist theorists (Kenny and Florida, 1988; Piore and Sabel, 1984), lean 
production advocates argue that new work systems invert the Taylorist labor process 
based on deskilled work and rigid authority hierarchies (MacDuffie, 1995a; MacDuffie, 
1995b; MacDuffie and Kochan, 1995; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996; Womack et al., 1990). In 
its place would be work organization utilizing broadly skilled workers, empowered 
through extensive involvement in problem-solving, decision-making and continuous 
improvement. Broad agreement that performance is most dramatically improved when a 
package of complementary organizational and HR practices – including extensive 
employee involvement (EI) or empowerment – is implemented generated strong 
expectations that high-involvement practices would be widely used by manufacturers 
(Cappelli et al., 1997; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Kling, 1995; Levine and Tyson, 1990; 
MacDuffie, 1995a). Sample data suggest, however, that thorough, comprehensive 
restructuring is not the norm (Freeman and Rogers, 1999: 96; MacDuffie and Pil, 1995; 
Osterman, 1994). A wide range of case studies also demonstrates limited and selective 
adoption of new work practices. Three distinct positions can be found in this critical 
literature.  
An early critical position rejected the idea that lean production involved worker 
empowerment, arguing instead that it is based on work intensification and better process 
control. Dohse and collaborators (1985) argue that the system enlists employees in tightly 
controlled participation in developing standards. For Berggren (1992), lean production 
limits worker discretion and increases the negative aspects of highly regimented work 
due to the considerable mental concentration required by bufferless production and new 
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quality pressures. Similarly, Lewchuk and Robertson (1997) and Parker and Slaughter 
(1995) charge that by combining standardization, increased system interdependence and 
reduced staffing, lean production achieves better process control in a system where 
worker empowerment is irrelevant.   
A second position sees participatory arrangements as engaged in a new, 
ideological or cultural form of labor control. Graham contends that lean production is a 
system of intense managerial domination in which, despite a decentralized structure, 
hierarchy remains intact due to intense pressures to conform enforced through constant 
monitoring of peers and team leaders (1995). For Barker, self-managing teams are a form 
of “concertive control” that is subtler, yet more powerful than traditional bureaucratic 
control, as strict self-discipline results from workers negotiating norms, values and rules 
(1993). Similarly, Grenier finds that quality circles de-bureaucratize control, as the rule 
of peers, rather than the “rule of rules,” veils the operation of hierarchical authority 
(1988: 131). All three claim that participative arrangements co-opt workers into a 
managerial perspective – thus maintaining hierarchical authority without bureaucratic 
control (see also Smith, 2001: 166; cf. Vallas, 1999).    
According to a third, intermediate position, selective adoption of new work 
practices may be the norm (Durand et al., 1999) and worker empowerment is seen neither 
as a necessary component of, nor incompatible with lean production (Eaton, 1995; 
Helper, 1995). Much work in this vein focuses on the process of restructuring, 
investigating how outcomes are shaped by the social and organizational processes 
surrounding implementation (Vallas, 2003b: 227). Case studies highlight the key role of 
the strategic orientation of management (Milkman, 1997; Shaiken and Browne, 1991; 
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Taplin, 2001; Thomas, 1994; Vallas, 2003b; Zuboff, 1988), the influence of local unions 
(Shaiken, 1993), and the effects of entrenched social relations at work (Thomas, 1989) 
and worker dispositions (Smith, 2001; Vallas, 2003a).  
Having found little evidence of a managerial emphasis on ideological control, I 
attempt to advance the intermediate position. Advocates of lean production argue that a 
work system is truly lean only if a given bundle of practices, including what I define 
below as substantive worker empowerment, is implemented in the proper configuration. 
In contrast, my interviews and observations in six US manufacturing plants demonstrate 
that extensive, substantive empowerment is not a necessary condition for achieving a lean 
manufacturing system that yields considerable performance improvement.  
The data presented here suggest that three variables identified in previous 
research – strategic orientation of management (including the approach to 
implementation), organized worker power, and workforce disposition – are key to 
understanding processes of work reorganization. I articulate an ‘organizational political 
economy’ account of work restructuring that emphasizes how these three variables 
interact in particular contexts, shaping and being shaped by the characteristics of local 
plant culture, politics and history. Depending on how managerial orientation, organized 
worker power and workforce disposition interact in particular contexts, lean practices 
may be implemented in various configurations (see Table 1) to achieve better process 
control, increased flexibility, reduced “waste” and some degree of continuous 
improvement. While many configurations appear to be ‘lean enough’ for satisficing 
managers, one commonality among the cases observed here is that worker empowerment 
is limited in both depth and breadth.2 Employee involvement may be limited in depth 
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because substantive empowerment requires a change in organizational routine and 
authority structure apparently not necessary to achieve the largely technical goals of 
management. However, advocates such as MacDuffie have not entirely missed the mark; 
when an employer embarks on major technical and social change, pushing beyond lean 
enough toward world-class organization by systematically revamping all of its 
interdependent systems, some degree of substantive empowerment appears to be 
necessary. Yet even in these cases substantive empowerment may be limited in extent 
due to the demands of standardization and managerial prerogative, as well as resistance 
and reticence among workers. 
 
2. Background concepts: The Fordist labor process and beyond 
Fordism is used here to denote supply-driven production of standardized products, 
organized in long runs to achieve cost reduction through scale economies, using a 
Taylorist division of labor which attempted to separate conception and execution through 
standardization and deskilling. In practice, output maximization was a primary goal of 
production and, combined with lack of sufficient demand, led to batch production, 
functional organization and large inventories that buffer the system. In batch production 
individual workstations produce parts in large lots that go into inventory; each functional 
department makes parts according to its own schedule without regard for upstream or 
downstream operations. Final products are “pushed” through the plant based on the 
forecast from a master schedule.  
The lean alternative, then, is demand-driven production in short runs, achieving 
efficiency through continuous improvement and optimized workflow with minimal 
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buffers. Based on just-in-time (JIT) and continuous flow principles, work is “pulled” 
through the factory based on customer demand. Continuous improvement, or kaizen, is 
argued to increased employee involvement (EI) in problem-solving and decision-making 
– empowerment – usually through teamwork. “Online” teams are small work groups, 
ideally engaged in job rotation either on assembly lines or in product-focused work cells. 
“Offline” teams are problem-solving committees of various sorts.  
Levine and Tyson distinguish consultative from substantive participation (1990). 
While consultative participation differs in important ways from traditional Taylorism, it 
should not therefore be automatically equated with worker empowerment. Power 
involves not just new responsibilities but the effective authority to claim resources, make 
decisions and alter routines (Babson, 1995: 5). From this perspective, the consultative 
form of participation is most accurately characterized as a nominal – slight – change. 
Substantive empowerment, then, involves new responsibilities, including regular 
involvement in problem-solving and decision-making activities, along with formal 
authority and effective capacity. Hallmarks of substantive empowerment include 
decision-making authority and lateral communication with team members and outside 
experts. Consultative participation, or nominal empowerment, involves active seeking of 
input from and/or the delegation of new responsibilities to workers, but without effective 
authority or regular engagement in decision-making and problem-solving. Hallmarks of 
nominal empowerment include new responsibilities without authority to alter 
organizational routines and ability to give input but not make decisions.  
  
3. Managerial orientation, worker power, and workforce disposition  
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Organizational change is structured by managerial orientation and approach, including 
what types of changes are attempted and how they are implemented (Thomas, 1994). A 
managerial orientation that privileges technical rationality, for instance, can severely limit 
the success of team-based participatory initiatives (Vallas, 2003b). Milkman shows that 
where first-line supervisors are given no incentive to see new arrangements work and are 
encouraged to gain productivity by whatever means, changes are not enduring (1997: 
178). Similarly, Taplin finds that managers may resist workplace innovations, even if 
they improve organizational performance, where they do not produce tangible gains in 
metrics by which managers are evaluated. Further, when change is forced upon them 
managers they may direct change to fit their own needs (2001; see also Zuboff, 1988). 
 While the strategic orientation of management also plays a key role in the plants I 
visited, a focus on cultural control was not evident in my observations. This may be an 
important managerial focus only in certain contexts, such as when implementing highly 
intense lean work in an auto assembly plant with a history of adversarial relations 
(Graham, 1995) or in the context of an anti-union drive (Grenier, 1988). The important 
point for present purposes is that local context is key in shaping managerial focus. In the 
cases presented below, organized worker power and workforce disposition have 
important effects on managerial orientation, as well as exerting an independent influence 
on the change process.  
 Under certain conditions unions may facilitate substantive empowerment. While 
unions may be a potent source of resistance, Vallas’ (2003b) research suggests active 
union involvement may help drive workplace change in a participatory direction (see also 
Adler and Borys, 1996: 81). Shaiken finds that union participation may modify change 
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efforts in key ways such as increasing worker input and training (1993: 42). In addition to 
this direct role, union governance may provide a framework for, and context more 
permissive of, substantive devolution of decision-making authority. By providing an 
institutional mechanism through which workers may appropriate and solidify effective 
authority (Eaton, 1995) – where managers do not have complete control of the workplace 
– unionization may alter the incentive structure of nominal versus substantive 
empowerment is altered (Figure 1).  
 In a nonunion shop, the changes required for nominal empowerment are relatively 
straightforward, consisting in a series of technical changes using lean tools coupled with 
the solicitation of workers’ ideas. However, substantive empowerment requires 
significant changes in authority structure and workplace culture, potentially increasing 
perceived costs – and uncertainty – enough to offset expected benefits. In a union shop, 
in contrast, managers often have to deal with contractual issues such as extremely 
detailed job classifications. Many changes must be formally negotiated and the employer 
confronts a potentially organized resistance. Under these conditions even nominal 
empowerment may be perceived as entailing relatively high costs. However, with an 
already-altered authority structure, from the employer’s perspective some of the negative 
effects of substantive empowerment, such as increased wage and training demands, are 
already present. The potential costs of moving to substantive empowerment may not be 
much higher than the costs of nominal empowerment in a union shop.  
Finally, regarding workforce disposition, there is much work demonstrating that 
workers creatively resist and appropriate new practices to their own advantage (Hodson, 
1995; Hodson, 1996; Smith, 2001). Smith finds that workers’ endorsement of 
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participatory practices was “conditioned by the structural arrangements and the social 
relations of their jobs,” particularly the opportunities that EI initiatives offered to help 
them negotiate stressful and complex work relations (1996: 177). Similarly, Thomas 
argues that “the context in which employee participation efforts are undertaken will be 
extremely influential in determining their success or failure” (1989: 118). I now develop 
a framework for understanding how this broader context mediates the operation of 
managerial orientations, worker power and workforce disposition. 
 
4. Organizational political economy: Toward a micropolitics of work restructuring 
The theory developed here, which I call organizational political economy, draws on the 
“power process” approach advanced by Thomas (1994) and Vallas (2003b), adding to it 
key insights organization theory. Organizational change is shaped by how the potentially 
competing interests of different organizational actors are articulated and pursued. 
Individual choice is based on a “satisficing” rationality involving a selective search for 
alternatives that are “evaluated for their satisfactoriness as they are found.” Such choice 
always involves a simplified definition of the situation (March and Simon, 1993: 8; my 
emphasis). For management, the incentive structure of proposed changes is key.   
Regarding worker disposition, Burawoy argues that as workers become actively 
engaged in the labor process they develop stakes in particular rules and objectives (1987: 
38), while Thomas argues that organizational forms become institutionalized over time, 
gaining a sense of legitimacy rooted in deeply held interests and assumptions surrounding 
workplace relations. Organizations are collections of worldviews, which affect how 
participants perceive their roles in change (Thomas, 1994). Worker behavior may be 
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understood as a complex combination of imported commitments (e.g., regarding fairness 
and hard work) that provide a broader normative context within which rational 
preferences may be endogenously produced, with such commitments and preferences 
taking specific shape in the context of particular work arrangements, routines and 
relations (Freeland, 2001). Thus worker disposition – enthusiasm, reticence, or resistance 
– may follow rationally from plant-specific local history and/or from how new work 
arrangements are implemented. Important elements of local history and politics are 
entrenched practices, the collective memory of workers and informal agreements 
(Thomas, 1989). 
Organizational actors tend to “evaluate action only in terms of subgoals, even 
when these are in conflict with the goals of the larger organization” (March and Simon, 
1993: 173). Fordism encouraged a series of discrete sub-goal foci – with its functional 
organization, disconnected operations, and focus on machine-level efficiency – shaping 
the orientations of workers as well as of middle managers, who often focused on output 
maximization at the expense of quality (Dohse et al., 1985; Forrant, 2000). Lean 
production is in part an attempt to subordinate sub-goals to larger goals through various 
institutional arrangements to engender an overall system focus. Yet inherent tensions 
remain, particularly regarding contradictions between standardization and participation 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Lawler, 1994; Vallas, 2003b: 245).  
The lean focus on standardization, many analysts argue, results in a neotaylorist 
regime where participation is consultative and tightly controlled (Berggren, 1992; Dohse 
et al., 1985; Graham, 1995; Shaiken and Browne, 1991; Thomas, 1989). Others agree, 
but contend that the lean version is an improvement because workers participate in 
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defining methods and standardization is focused on collective learning, what Adler calls 
“democratic Taylorism” (Adler, 1995) and Klein refers to as increased collective 
autonomy (Klein, 1991: 32). Hackman and Wageman (1995) agree in part but are more 
skeptical, arguing that only a small set of workers is typically engaged in such activities, 
with the rest of the workforce subject to motivationally detrimental standardized work.3 
Perhaps formalization procedures can be better designed to enable “mastery of tasks” 
(Adler and Borys, 1996: 61-2), but it is important to examine the form of participation as 
well as the type of formalization.  
The theory of organizational political economy suggests these outcomes vary by 
local context. In the data presented below, I observe three outcomes regarding worker 
empowerment (Table 1). First, lean enough with nominal empowerment is observed 
where managers see good enough performance improvements within a traditional 
authority context. This situation results when management focuses on the technical 
aspects of lean production and traditional performance metrics, where there is a lack of 
organized worker power, and where the workforce disposition is largely complaint (the 
workforce is either largely amenable and/or reticent). Under nominal empowerment there 
is little increase in individual or collective autonomy.  
Second, limited substantive empowerment occurs where the strategic orientation 
of management includes some substantive empowerment. Yet, substantive empowerment 
is limited because of the extremely complicated social processes involved in changing 
workplace culture and developing a durable institutional structure of routines, practices 
and worldviews that can support extensive substantive empowerment. In one case 
substantive empowerment is further limited by serious worker resistance, due to a local 
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union culture that values craft pride and highly individualized work, while in another 
worker reticence was more of a problem. In both cases substantive empowerment does 
increase individual and collective autonomy, though as Hackman and Wageman suggest 
this is limited to a subset of workers and situations.  
Finally, stalled (and limited) substantive empowerment results in cases where 
management attempts some substantive empowerment, but with a problematic approach 
that attempts too much too quickly, without sufficient regard for the dispositions and 
culture of their workers. What differentiates cases of stalled (and limited) substantive 
empowerment from those where empowerment is limited but not stalled is primarily 
managerial approach to restructuring. Substantive empowerment may be limited, 
generally, due to the complexity of cultural change, including problems with resistance 
and reticence among the workforce. What distinguishes stalled substantive empowerment 
from the former situation is a managerial approach that is relatively unstructured and 
unmethodical. In particular, without sufficient attention to workforce disposition, novel 
problems in addition to general complexity may arise. In the cases below, attempts to 
push substantive empowerment too far without regard for institutional supports generate 
role conflict and stress, thus eroding elements of “enabling bureaucracy” (Adler and 
Borys, 1996). In one case workers are resistant and unwilling while in another they are 
reticent, but in both cases they unprepared.  
  
5. Data and method 
The present analysis is based on interviews conducted from 2002-2004 in six plants in the 
US Midwest that have made significant attempts to implement lean production. I 
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conducted a total of forty semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven workers, ten 
managers, and the “business representative” for each of the three union shops. The 
management interviews ranged from one and a half to over three hours and the worker 
interviews ranged from half an hour to one hour. Each site visit included a plant tour. 
Additionally, I attended seven labor-management committee meetings, one worker 
education committee meeting, and one shop-floor training exercise at one union shop; 
and seven labor-management committee meetings, two worker education committee 
meetings, one local union meeting, and one half-day presentation by the IAM High 
Performance Work Organization department at another union shop. Finally, as many 
documents as possible were collected, including performance metrics. All names are 
pseudonyms. 
 My methodological approach here is in the vein of Burawoy’s extended case 
method. Rather than seeking generalizations by abstracting from time and place, I seek 
historically and geographically specific causality, reconstructing theory (Burawoy, 1991) 
by examining the operation of structural tendencies in particular contexts. The six plants 
presented here provide an opportunity to deepen our understanding of workplace 
restructuring by examining how similar and different outcomes are produced in specific 
contexts. A particular advantage in this regard is that the present research extends beyond 
the standard context of auto assembly plants or large, final-goods producing plants to the 
situation of supplier plants and/or small- to mid-sized enterprises, across a range of 
durable-goods producing industries. Following Vallas (2003b), I seek to identify how 
important variations and regularities are generated by particular social and organizational 
processes.  
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6. ‘Lean enough’ with nominal empowerment  
6.1 Relative performance improvements with a technical orientation 
At Tubefab and Integrated Corp, a managerial focus on the technical aspects of lean 
production has been pursued in the context of a nonunion and largely compliant 
workforce. In both cases, management has seen relative performance improvements 
without substantially altering job content or the social structure of the plant. Tubefab, 
which makes tubular metal products and filters, has become relatively lean by 
implementing JIT practices and moving from having separate functional departments for 
tube bending, tube finishing and tube assembly to having all of operations combined in a 
single fabrication department composed of product-focused cells. Inventory buffers have 
been reduced and batch production has been replaced with continuous flow in tube 
fabrication. Yet, they maintain a separate press department, in large part because of some 
huge 400-ton straight-side presses that are “a logistical nightmare” to move. As the plant 
manager noted their highest volume cell 
 
runs continuously at about 140 parts an hour … there’s five pressed components in there. 
So that's only ... 700 parts an hour that you need to make. And generally straight-sides 
can run 1,200 to 2,000 parts an hour depending on the size of the part. So you're only 
utilizing that press to half capacity. [U]nless you had … one press feeding two cells 
somehow, it would be a challenge. … Or if you redesigned dies to make less hits an hour 
but get multiple different parts out of the die or something, but, you know. It would be a 
struggle.  
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This is not to say that the problem is insurmountable, and indeed many lean gurus 
would love to tackle the job. But the way the manager frames the problem indicates how 
a given definition of the situation can shape managerial orientation in ways that constrain 
alternatives. Rather than tackling the problem directly, by focusing on setup reductions 
and process mapping, and engaging workers to find innovative solutions, management is 
preoccupied with traditional Fordist concerns epitomized by standard cost accounting – 
here capacity utilization and, as will be seen shortly, direct labor utilization. Will 
“competitive pressures” force them embrace the logistical nightmare as a way to gain 
new capabilities through revamping old routines? Tubefab is doing well in terms of 
profits, customers, and quality; since they have implemented their limited, selective 
version of lean production, their PPMs – defect parts per million, a key quality measure 
for large volume producers –  have gone from about 1500 to around 100 and on-time 
delivery has gone from below 90% to about 98%. In terms of performance Tubefab is 
apparently lean enough, effectively doing JIT for their customers. 
Further, the Tubefab case demonstrates how some of the sheer technical obstacles 
to implementing lean production may shape a manager’s definition of the situation in a 
way that de-emphasizes EI. Tubefab’s understanding of what they need to do to stay 
ahead does not include substantively empowering their workforce; when management is 
concerned with work reorganization, technical problems and an emphasis on particular 
metrics such as inventory reduction and on-time delivery dominates the focus of 
attention. Management goals are focused on those lean practices that generate 
performance improvements captured by standard measures – here, inventory reduction 
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and delivery – to the neglect of arrangements which may improve performance but not 
deliver tangible gains in terms of traditional metrics (Taplin, 2001).  
Integrated Corp is a much larger company that has some work organized into 
functional departments and other work organized into product-focused departments with 
cells. The division of labor includes highly detailed job classifications organized into 
online work teams that are involved in continuous improvement activities, as well as 
offline quality and process improvement teams in each department. Integrated is 
relatively lean in terms of practices like point of use production, smaller lot sizes, and 
less work-in-progress (WIP) inventory, though my observations during a plant tour 
suggested that there may be some serious problems with haphazard product routings and 
workflow. Nonetheless, they have implemented continuous flow principles and pull 
systems in certain areas and claimed that on-time delivery, quality and inventory 
management have been steadily improving. 
Like Tubefab, Integrated has been able to institutionalize a neotaylorist process in 
which a focus on work standardization dominates managerial focus, though Integrated 
retains more traditional functional organization, due partly to the large number of 
processes it maintains in house. Integrated seeks to selectively adopt lean practices within 
this context of high organizational complexity, focusing more directly and regularly on 
kaizen than Tubefab, constantly standardizing better methods and tinkering with the 
production process. This revamping of processes is largely at the margins, however 
without much substantive involvement of front-line workers or sustained focus on 
fundamental restructuring. Yet, management seems quite content with the improvements 
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it has seen over its former Fordist performance in terms of lower inventories and better 
quality, delivery, and functional flexibility.  
 
6.2. Consultative participation within a traditional authority structure 
Tubefab and Integrated have become lean enough, restructuring to a neotaylorist labor 
process with nominal worker empowerment, with a workforce compliant largely because 
the changes implemented have had little effect on the design or content of jobs. While 
workers are offered the opportunity – indeed, highly encouraged – to give their ideas 
about process improvement, the jobs of frontline workers remain highly regimented and 
traditionally organized. Further, in each case local plant history has been relatively 
conducive to a workforce amenable to such technical changes.  
The employment strategy of Tubefab’s parent firm is to be the best employer, in 
terms of wages and stability, in rural areas. Additionally, they have implemented changes 
such as cells mostly with selectively targeted employees or volunteers,4 approaching 
change slowly and with little problem after an initial experience with some reticence 
among workers during an attempt to decentralize of quality control. Integrated also seeks 
to be a “good” employer, providing its employees with high levels of job security and 
ample opportunities for training. Additionally, one thing that stands out at Integrated is 
the extensive communication with front-line workers about management strategy and 
future plans, which contrasts with a lack of communication in other plants I observed, 
generating skepticism and uneasiness on the shopfloor.   
Tubefab offers opportunities for involvement through offline quality, safety and 
kaizen teams. While some workers are involved in setup reduction, this process is 
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initiated and supervised by a continuous improvement (CI) coordinator through 
occasional kaizen events; the offline teams are composed of volunteers and Tubefab 
operates without online work teams. An (hourly) assistant supervisor described the 
continuous improvement process: 
 
Initially I feel it was more or less just kind of thrown on the table for us. But … now is 
when the employee involvement is coming in.  ‘Well, okay, this is what we have to do. 
How do we get there most efficiently? Okay, you’re the one that’s working on it day after 
day after day, so you come up with a better way. This is the direction we’re heading,” 
you know management kind of points you in a direction, but you have to get to the 
destination. ... we probably go through and make changes, run after run. ... It’s a 
continuing learning process.  
 
This description is very characteristic of the lean process, constant tinkering and 
continual learning. And while employee input is actively solicited and workers’ ideas are 
often tried, this process operates within the framework of a traditional authority hierarchy 
– topics and goals are defined by management, individual autonomy is severely 
restricted, and deliberation and decision-making are limited.  
A front-line worker describes the core EI process in more detail:  
 
A new job comes into the plant where a lot of times we’ll have a meeting … to get 
everybody’s ideas. We’ll bring welders in and people from press department in, see if 
they have any ideas on any issues with the new product. A lot of times that will help if we 
can get, if … somebody will bring something up ahead of time that we might not know, 
we can solve that problem before it becomes a problem. I think we need more of that. ... 
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But … the foreman and the production people [i.e., CI coordinator and manufacturing 
engineers] don’t want to pull these guys off the line, because that’s our moneymaker ... 
they don’t want to pull them off the line for a half hour to come into a meeting, or for an 
hour and sit in a meeting, they kind of shy away from that. 
 
The process is directed and controlled by managers and engineers. Offline teams are 
staffed by a limited group of volunteers and the inclination not to “pull them off the line” 
further limits the breadth of EI. Treating workers as sources of ideas and innovation 
conflicts with the tendency to employ the labor power of workers as a commodity whose 
surplus labor-time must be increased (Marx, 1990 [1867]). Every second of front-line 
workers’ time is considered wasted if not directly doing physical work – “adding value.” 
Lack of communication is also problematic for some workers: “there’s just so many 
things that a person don’t know what’s going on around here. … they do show us, when 
we’re having like a good month or something … but … there’s … no kickback on that 
either … what do we get out of it? [We] work our butts off for it.”  
When further probed about the main ways in which they can contribute their ideas 
to improve production processes the assistant supervisor replied “Anytime anybody has 
an issue or a way to make things better, they generally take it up with the foreman. ... It's 
general one-on-one communication with the supervisor.” Others agreed that one-on-one 
communication with the foreman was the main channel for employee input, not unlike a 
suggestion program.  
 The periodic kaizen events function simply to extract workers’ ideas for 
continuous improvement rather than as fora for the reintegration of conception and 
execution: “You know they’ve got meetings where you can put your input in. I mean if 
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something gets done or not is another story, but they do let you put your input in.” This 
last comment was a common refrain indicating how little workers were actually involved 
in making decisions. Another worker indicates that in his work cell decisions about job 
rotation, task delegation, etc. are “up to the foreman … if the foreman don’t want you to 
do it, then you can’t.” 
In contrast to Tubefab, with their online teams of cross-trained workers Integrated 
has achieved a substantial amount of functional flexibility in their ability to deploy the 
same labor for different product lines and task mixes. The “team concept” has been 
implemented very extensively at many levels, with both online and offline teams. They 
have periodic group meetings and a yearly anonymous survey to get employee feedback. 
Employees generally, in the words of one worker, “look at procedures … [and] always 
[try] to make it faster and better and easier on the person and everything else.” Or as the 
plant manager described, “We have manufacturing engineers … they are to be out here 
on the floor, working with the supervisors, talking to the associates on the floor, looking 
at a piece of equipment, how can they make that more efficient?” But this continuous 
improvement happens in the context of traditional authority hierarchy and does not 
systematically target lead time – total time it takes to make a product, from the receipt of 
an order through all operations to shipment – reduction, which should be a core focus of 
lean efforts to eliminate “waste.” Decisions on reorganization and new layouts are made 
by supervisors and engineers and implemented as such.  
Workers can make suggestions to make their work better and management 
actively encourages this.  Indeed, management does use the language of substantive 
empowerment: “We want the associates to take more ownership than what they do [to be] 
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self-directed.” This vision, however, includes not increased autonomy, deliberation and 
decision-making, but simply the active generation of ideas for managers and engineers to 
consider: “Can they [participate and give input]? Yes, absolutely. But it’s not designated 
that they have to go to a specific person. It’s really going through their elite person on the 
floor, going through their supervisor, or stopping an engineer … [M]y people are 
instructed that you will listen to the associates, alright, because that’s where a lot of these 
ideas are generated, because they work with it every day.” The plant manager is satisfied 
with their current institutional configuration that has been able to achieve continuous 
improvement with consultative participation.  
When a worker with 19 years tenure described her experience with team projects I 
asked if there has been real decentralization of decision-making authority, and she 
enthusiastically replied, “Definitely.” But then when I asked for more detail she gave the 
following reply, indicating the nominal character of such empowerment: 
 
Basically it would kind of seem like in years past that we would hear something through 
the grapevine kind of thing, and then it would happen. And now, when it’s going to 
happen, they’ll tell us what's going to happen, and what to expect, and get our input on it 
now, ahead of time. ... A lot more communication, a lot more – like the newsletter that 
comes out, memos. I bet we get at least ten memos a week ... they’ve always tried to 
make the employees – now they call them associates, just I mean like because we feel 
more like it too – but they really, really communicate, just totally tell us what’s going on.  
 
So they’re honestly trying to get your input on these changes, I asked. “Yeah. Something 
like that, you know, there really isn’t much for us to say except for the fact that we 
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understand. They’re explaining why the business is doing this.” The rest of her interview 
indicates that little, if any of this feeling came from any increase in substantive 
empowerment. Some of it clearly comes from the fact that management is now willing to 
listen to worker input, but much of the source of her enthusiastic disposition followed 
from a high level of job security and increased communication from management. 
 
7. Limited substantive empowerment  
The foregoing indicates the relative ease in selectively implementing lean practices with 
nominal empowerment in a nonunion environment; neither workers nor managers 
discussed any serious resistance to or problems with implementing the largely technical 
changes. If a worker’s routine changed in an undesirable way, she had no other options 
but to adapt or quit. In contrast, one plant below, Second Tier Specialist, demonstrates 
how similar types of technical change can be significantly more problematic in a union 
shop, especially when workers are invested in given arrangements. Another plant, Mini 
OE, also a union shop but facing relatively unique circumstances, did not experience such 
constraints. Both have taken a step further than the nonunion plants discussed above in 
terms of actively working toward self-directed teams, in part because they already 
operated under power-sharing arrangements. Yet, in each case substantive empowerment 
is still limited due to the sheer complexity involved in actually transforming the political 
and cultural relations in the plant necessary for extensive substantive empowerment. 
Empowerment is also limited in the more structural sense that even when organizations 
push toward some substantive empowerment it is uneven and limited in breadth; some 
workers simply do not experience the opportunity for much more than consultative 
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participation as many elements of the overall labor process remain necessarily 
standardized with severely limited discretion.  
 
7.1 Lean practices and local unions 
In the two plants discussed in this section, management considered some degree of 
substantive empowerment to be an important element of restructuring. Because local 
unions have altered the authority structure in the plants, the incentives facing 
management differ from those in a nonunion context – there is no structure of unilateral, 
unchallenged management power to be threatened. Second Tier Specialist, a low volume 
producer of industrial cylinders, did value stream mapping (VSM) – a core lean tool used 
to optimize work flow through process mapping – on all of their products with the help of 
their parent company and reorganized the whole shop into three cells. Having made great 
strides from a splintered organizational structure and a high-waste, traditional 
manufacturing organization, lead time has been reduced on two common cylinders from 
18 days to 8 and 5, respectively, and they expect further dramatic improvements. On-time 
delivery has moved from 27% to the 80s in two years. 
The attempts to implement even relatively modest changes such as job rotation 
and cross training at Second Tier met with quite serious worker resistance. As the 
manager explained, when moving from large batch processing to a pull system based on 
customer demand, the focus is no longer from “an efficiency standpoint of the machine 
and how much a person can produce. Instead, the whole goal in the future … is move the 
people to where the work is, have them as highly trained and able to run different 
machines, perform different operations.” With a restrictive contract with over 50 job 
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descriptions and a traditional union culture with very long average tenure (22 years), 
worker resistance to cross-training and job “enrichment” has been a serious obstacle, 
though they’ve had some help with people working outside classifications, otherwise 
moving to cells would have been “a real mess.” This situation may be contrasted with the 
impressive amount of functional flexibility that Integrated Corp was able to achieve with 
its job rotation. While the union structure provides an impediment in this regard, 
however, the local union leadership also provides an important source of support for 
negotiating restructuring initiatives. 
As the union president notes, even though the union has formally signed on to a 
partnership, restructuring is a struggle, even with some members of the shop committee.  
 
I’m pushing it as hard as I can do. I’m receiving a lot of backlash. The backlash that I 
receive is intense … I’ve had a few clashes with the committee. … I see more people 
getting on the bandwagon. … the feeling that I get is most of the older employees who 
have been here a long time, I get the feeling that we’re trying to tell them what they need 
to do in their job and that’s a tough row to hoe  … they’re tough to sway.   
 
Management is working closely with the union leadership to implement changes 
and bring the workforce on board. In the plant manager’s words:  
 
Before me the process was dictated from above. Now I let them know what we need help 
in and we work together. So it’s going over much better than the dictated approach which 
was going on before I got here, and that was very clumsy and met with a lot of resistance 
from the shop floor, which I fully understand. The company did a crappy job of 
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implementing kaizen in the first place. First it was kamikaze kaizen . ...We’re still in the 
process of educating people on the different lean tools and how to implement them 
 
A labor-management partnership has been instrumental in establishing a 
framework permissive of substantive empowerment, but it is important to properly 
understand the role of this partnership. A partnership based around a labor-management 
committee helps to move labor-management relations beyond an adversarial model and 
to formalize a framework for collaboration. By providing a framework for formal power 
sharing and deliberation, such a framework may facilitate other forms of substantive 
empowerment.5 However, while such a partnership may greatly facilitate substantive 
empowerment under certain conditions – namely, a collaborationist union leadership and 
a committed management – it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
substantive empowerment.   
 The situation at Second Tier, which is likely closer to the standard situation in 
union shops, contrasts greatly with that at Mini OE, which has a number of unique 
aspects. Like at Second Tier, the collaborationist stance of the local union leadership at 
Mini OE plays a key role in facilitating the restructuring process, though this was also a 
problem for a small segment of the workforce who was apparently dissatisfied with the 
restructuring but also felt distanced from the union. Beyond this, however, the differences 
are quite large. Unlike most union shops, Mini OE did not have an extremely detailed and 
complex structure of job classifications. Also, the average tenure in the shop is very low, 
contributing to a lack of resistance from the rank and file. As discussed below, these 
workers have not developed significant stakes in given arrangements, and the workers I 
talked with indicated that there was not much discussion of the restructuring process on 
 25 
the shopfloor. As one worker noted of the workforce “they just do their job and don’t say 
nothing.” This contrasts greatly with Second Tier specialist, and the other union shop 
presented below, where substantial parts of the long-tenured workforce put up serious 
resistance and there was heated debate on the shopfloor about the reorganization.  
A small union shop, Mini OE is a high volume producer of industrial wire wheels 
for metal finishing. Almost fully cellularized, with the implementation of 16 assembly 
cells constituting four teams, Mini OE has reduced its lead times dramatically from 3 
days down to hours. They don’t have much by way of other performance metrics, 
however, because there was no documentation until the new management came in the 
year before I began my interviews there. However, with the cells, training, better 
scheduling, material handling, and product flows they have increased output 18% with 
17% less workers (though attrition) over the year.  
Like Second Tier and unlike the other “lean conversions” discussed above, a 
substantive empowerment is explicitly part of the conceptual framework of the managers 
at Mini OE. While Mini OE has not yet actually gotten to the point of having much 
employee involvement and substantive empowerment, this case is instructive for its 
determined attempt to implement a high-involvement lean model, in particular its 
relatively structured and methodical, though far from unproblematic approach to 
restructuring. The importance of managerial approach to implementing change is 
discussed in the next subsection along with the key, though different roles played by local 
plant histories. 
 
7.2 Local plant history and approach to restructuring  
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The effects of local plant history loom large in the efforts of Second Tier management. 
Worker experience with management fads and other aborted attempts in the past 
generated a healthy skepticism among the workforce, as one worker explains: “We had 
some people come in here and said they were going to do wonderful things for us. ... And 
things didn’t transpire the way they said they would” Similar sentiments were common: 
“We’ve been hit the face with the mallet so many times before, it’s hard to know what to 
believe;” “We’ve done kaizen before and they were all gung-ho about it . . . for about 
four days.” Additionally, the workers’ experience with the previous a previous attempt 
where upper management sought to implement new practices and arrangements in a top-
down fashion without negotiation had provoked resistance and left a residue of distrust in 
the workforce.  
Other sources of worker resistance and skepticism follow from the stakes they 
have developed in given arrangements. At Second Tier many of the workers had 
mastered one particular machine and had become accustomed to coming in every day and 
working only on this one machine. Most of the workers had a deep craft pride in their 
work, and expressed keen interest in the performance of the plant as a whole. Such 
workers’ understanding of their work was very much based in and around the routine 
they had developed by working on a single machine. They were not interested in cross 
training and job rotation; their work values were based in doing one thing and doing it 
well, and such values provide a normative context in which these workers developed 
preferences for particular kinds of work. Yet, as I have shown elsewhere (Vidal, 
Forthcoming), even under this traditional Taylorist model, the “one thing” that these 
workers did actually consisted in a complex array of activities that involved careful 
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attention and detailed, precise work that was considered challenging and rewarding. For 
these workers new routines and responsibilities required a substantial reorganization of 
work arrangements they had appropriated as their own and solidified in a union contract. 
Combined with their distrust of management due to previously aborted or failed 
initiatives, these workers developed a definition of the situation in which there is a clear 
demarcation between their interests and that of management. Despite a collaborationist 
union leadership, the skepticism and resistance on the shopfloor served to limit the extent 
of substantive empowerment, which must be embraced by workers if it is to function 
effectively. 
The approaches of management at both Second Tier and Mini OE are well-
structured and disciplined, relative to the cases presented next. The Wisconsin Regional 
Training Partnership (WRTP) has facilitated the development of a labor-management 
partnership at Mini OE.6 Also with the help of the WRTP, Mini OE has done extensive 
training in literacy and numeracy, including blueprint reading and measurement, which 
they understand explicitly as a first step toward empowering. Direct employee 
classifications have been reduced from four to a single job classification and all 
employees moved up to a single pay rate. The restructuring process at Mini OE was 
further eased by this universal move up in pay and the institution of a pay-for-skill plan in 
which workers are paid more for cross-training on new machines. These characteristics – 
good base pay and opportunities for training with incentive pay – combined with the lack 
of developed stakes in traditional arrangements to produce a relatively painless 
transformation. While Second Tier also approached change in a relatively structured way 
– being sensitive to the workforce culture and disposition, approaching change slowly 
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and negotiating it with the union – their transformation has been hampered by problems 
in terms of HR management, including a lack of time to follow through on training 
promises, problems with the incentive structures of compensation packages, and lack of 
communication.  
The contrast between Mini OE and Second Tier was also clear in the functioning 
of their labor-management teams, which seemed to mirror the more general tone of labor-
relations at the plants. At Second Tier, despite months of work and progress together, a 
huge lack of trust remained evident on both sides. It appears that trust and cooperation 
cannot be easily forged in the conference room when they do not exist outside of it. 
While the labor-management meetings at Second Tier were filled with nitpicking and 
arguments, usually minor but sometimes major, the meetings at Mini OE that operated 
with relative efficiency and focus, nearly always staying on task. Yet, even at Second 
Tier management did adhere to the consensus decision-making process, for the most part, 
though “that’s a management call” was occasionally invoked.   
 
7.3 Limits to substantive empowerment 
In addition to being committed to the labor-management committee structure, 
management in both plants seems ready to further cede unilateral control in many areas, 
working toward a form of employee involvement and a decentralization of decision-
making authority apparently not contemplated in Tubefab or Integrated. A Mini OE 
manager’s response to my question about his vision for worker empowerment differs 
quite dramatically from the operation of the otherwise lean nonunion firms I visited:  
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If I had a magic wand, I’d like to envision these [cells] as 16 separate little businesses 
standing outside that can run autonomous; have their own leaderships, skill sets, setup, 
repair, tooling, common material . ... Because they need to make all those decisions, 
scheduling, when does it go in, repair parts, maintenance, greasing and oiling, inventory 
transactions, training issues, product improvement, process improvements. 
 
Some concrete steps toward substantive empowerment are evident at Mini OE. 
They operate with a very flat organizational structure, only a few engineers and two 
managers. A union member responsible for a group of cells handles scheduling and 
materials. Direct workers are also involved in quality control, total productive 
maintenance (TPM) and some planning of tasks. Though there have not been any regular 
kaizen events yet, there are plans to start when they finish up the incumbent worker 
training and an initial process of work standardization. They do operate, however, within 
a neotaylorist framework with workers participating in standardization efforts. 
The three major problems with Mini OE’s restructuring process are apathy among 
the rank-and-file workers, poor communication and a targeted approach to empowerment. 
A common complaint among workers that I talked to is that management has “kept us in 
the dark” about changes. In the case of Mini OE, as with Second Tier, this problem was 
as much the fault of the union as it was management. Perhaps a deeper issue, related also 
to communication, has to do with how labor-management relations are managed in the 
process of implementing new practices. As one worker describes  
 
This company … they just want you to push, push. … I’m going to do my job, and I’m 
going to do it to the best of my ability. But, they act like they’re so ungrateful … our 
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boss, he never has come out, “You did a good job,” or nothing like that. They don’t talk 
to the people… [W]ay back, we didn’t have a problem with management stuff. They tried 
to work with you, they tried to be honest with you, and they didn’t have favorite people 
and all that, you know.   
 
The reference to “favorite people” refers to a management tactic of picking key 
individuals on the shopfloor to help implement change through. This focus on key 
“leaders” may have the unintended result of generating ill will among neglected workers. 
It also contributes to limiting the breadth of empowerment. Here too, it seems that if there 
was substantive empowerment going on it failed to extend throughout the organization, 
even if there is greater opportunity for some substantive participation. Yet for some 
workers, at least, these opportunities do not alter their basic experience as workers in a 
capitalist factory; as one responded to my question about whether individuals were 
working outside their job descriptions to make the transition work, in the end the workers 
must, otherwise “they would be all laid off. … [T]hey’re the boss, they call the shots. We 
just follow their orders.” 
 The extent of substantive empowerment is also limited at Second Tier, though 
there are some real opportunities for participation. At the individual level, these 
opportunities include helping decide issues such as what the cell needs to spend money 
on or what it needs to do from in terms of fixturing. Most substantive empowerment at 
Second Tier and Mini OE, however, is collective, including participation in kaizen events 
as well as the representative participation of the labor-management committee and other 
sub-committees, which engage in some non-trivial co-management.  
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The following comment by the plant manager illustrates the type of situation in 
which other workers may be expected to be involved in problem-solving and decision-
making, when reductions in batch size lead to the discovery of new bottlenecks by 
removing buffers that keep them hidden: 
 
My approach is you keep halving it. We were running as high on some of these end caps 
as several hundred. We’re now down into the eight to 24 quantities when we run them.  
The goal eventually is to get it down to six or four. So we just keep reducing down, and 
then you find the new bottle neck, and then work on that through setup reductions, and 
then you keep bringing it down. 
 
While such opportunities are real, and management seeks to actually engage workers in 
the decision-making process in such situations, they are also limited. For most of the 
workforce, most of the time, the work experience remains essentially unchanged. Not 
only are opportunities for substantive empowerment limited in breadth, but they are to a 
large degree limited to the type of collective autonomy discussed by Klein (1991). While 
there are some opportunities for increased individual worker discretion, these remain 
restricted to particular times and places, limited by the needs of standardization and the 
demands of managerial prerogative. In both plants, management still retains control over 
most organizational decisions and superintends team building and continuous 
improvement. 
 
8. Stalled (and limited) substantive empowerment 
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In the final two plants management also attempted to include some substantive 
empowerment in their lean transformation. At Industrial Pumps, management tried a top-
down approach to restructuring with “disastrous” results: they “had VPs and top 
managers sitting down there, cleaning machines, picking things up, throwing things out 
… the people that worked in the area, they just felt violated.” Somewhat ironically, when 
this “painful” experience induced management to attempt to implement substantively 
empowered teams, they met with worker reticence. Workers were unprepared, not really 
interested in or ready for expanded roles. At Custom Seats management attempted a 
similarly unstructured and undisciplined approach to change.7 Essentially trying to do too 
much too quickly, they met with a combination of worker reticence and outright 
resistance. In both cases, management was faced with a distinct paradox of 
empowerment: substantive empowerment and the process of kaizen may be experienced 
as disabling, when broadened responsibilities and increased authority and autonomy 
generate role conflict and other forms of increased stress.  
 
8.1 Neotaylorism with limited substantive empowerment  
Industrial Pumps, a nonunion shop, makes heavy-duty pumps that are sold primarily to 
the food and beverage industry. Before restructuring their system was extremely 
disconnected. Each operation was scheduled independently of the others; they worked 
from forecasts, making dozens of parts for each final assembly with pallets of parts 
scattered “everywhere.” They had two full-time expeditors who would spend “all day, 
every day, walking three or four different parts through the plant to just get a couple 
orders off.” Having moved away from forecasting they now make only what they have 
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orders for. Since implementing a number of lean practices, Industrial is dramatically 
more flexible. For example, on their CNC machining centers setup has gone from an hour 
and 15 minutes to 10 minutes or less. Five years ago they were quoting lead times at two 
weeks and typically shipping in about four weeks. Now they’re quoting one to two weeks 
and shipping in about four days. On time delivery has gone from 30 to about 90%.  
Elements of substantive empowerment are evident, particularly in terms of some 
real problem-solving opportunities. Yet on the whole empowerment at Industrial was 
rather limited in breadth – for most workers their daily routines are largely the same and 
they are able to offer ideas but not participate in decision-making. The main form of 
substantive participation is through various offline teams, including 5S8, setup reduction, 
and process-mapping kaizen teams. The managers espoused their new approach of trying 
to bring the workers on board. They   
 
not only spent a lot of time on pre-training, but explaining what we expected to get out of 
it. And even if I knew what I would really like to see them try and do, I wouldn’t say it, 
but I’d try to get them to say it … we spent a lot of time just having them discover … 
what a benefit of this could be. … We want it to be safe, we want it to be organized, we 
want it to be something that a lot of people can step up and do the same job at the same 
bench and get the same results. 
 
They related a story of how their 5S standardization process resulted in the removal of 
seven Craftsman toolboxes from an assembly area that had three people, which made 
sense to the workers once they came up with the ideas on their own. In “each toolbox was 
80 percent of the hand tools that Craftsman sells. … There was a complete set of metric 
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wrenches and a complete set of English wrenches. And out of all of that, [they] found out 
you don’t even need a wrench to build the pumps they built.”  
  One worker noted how he really felt that the new system was making his routine 
better and giving him more power 
 
If we find that … something doesn’t work in this area … I feel like I’ve got a better 
handle on my job, I have a little bit more control. … I’ve seen that through the value 
stream [mapping] … that you’re finding out where the processes start out, you know, in 
doing the maps and finding out what is an outside vendor issue and what isn’t. I’ve been 
able to approach … purchasing and again be able to ask them about when something’s 
going to come in and not feel like, oh, I’m stepping out of my bounds. 
 
This is one of the two workers that management indicated has really enthusiastically 
taken to the EI and whom management has focused much of their training and cultivation 
efforts on, hoping he will be a leader to bring other workers around. But this worker also 
noted that others who aren’t involved in the kaizen events do not really have any more 
control over their work situations.  
 When I asked what their main ways to give input and participate were, three 
workers responded almost identically “just talking to a supervisor.” Another responded 
more bluntly: “I’m not a decision maker. They don’t leave it up to me to make the 
decision.” This worker also quipped “They take our opinions. They weigh them. 
Sometimes they weigh against us.” The EI process remained largely one of workers 
giving input within a neotaylorist framework. As one supervisor explained 
“management’s open to any idea. … I mean it’s more or less we’re planning to move this 
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and you have an idea, you don’t tell us, I mean that’s your loss.” The effects of the 
standardization emphasis on employee participation were clearly evident to a machinist 
with 15 years tenure who said that now “it seems like there’s a lot more channels to go 
through” when you give input because each change has to be approved by the engineers 
and plant manager.  
 A similar process of limited substantive empowerment within a neotaylorist 
framework was evident at Custom Seats, a union shop that makes seats for the 
recreational vehicle and lawn and garden industries. Nearly all of their production is 
organized into cells. Inventory has been reduced significantly and their inventory turns – 
a common measure of how long inventory sits idle on the shelves – have been improving. 
On-time delivery in their oldest cell has gone from 92% at best before to consistently 
near 100%.  
One of the main jobs in the shop, sewing, is a highly skilled position which takes 
a minimum of twelve weeks to be fully trained on. There was a lot of craft knowledge 
possessed only by the workers, and the production process was often completely 
dependent on individual experts. Managers discussed in detail how the cells have been 
used as an opportunity to continuing to break down the tasks into smaller parts that can 
be standardized so the tacit knowledge more easily transferred. This was perhaps the 
clearest example of a neotaylorist model of work organization, as they broke down the 
core operation of seat-making, formerly done by one person, into four steps that would be 
done in cells by four workers. Workers were dissatisfied with this arrangement: “It’s 
taking four people now to do what one used to do, and I don’t know how this is 
beneficial, but that’s what’s happening”; and another worker similarly complains “I mean 
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they’ve got four people over there doing what I used to do by myself … I just don’t see 
how that’s benefiting anybody or anything.” 
At the same time Custom had in many ways attempted to introduce opportunities 
for substantive empowerment for some workers, including broadened responsibilities 
with increased authority in other areas. Workers were also partially reskilled through 
cross training and given substantially more authority and responsibility, which by 
increasing role conflict and stress, as discussed below, made some workers feel 
paralyzed. These problems were exacerbated by a transition from an individual piece rate 
system to a gainsharing system in which some workers lost between $5-10/hour, which 
generated serious antagonisms. The new hourly wage with team incentives through 
gainsharing had been negotiated without protections for the 29 workers it affected. This 
created a significant problem for the functioning of the new system, though it must be 
noted that the union President and VP took nearly 50% pay cuts each – apparently seeing 
the new platform as beneficial for the workforce as a whole.  
  
8.2 Role stress and disabling kaizen 
Custom Seats has a kaizen program with extensive and enthusiastic participation from 
some front-line workers. They still have traditional production supervisors and the would 
like to further decentralize scheduling and more indirect services into the cells but the 
union leadership is finding a lot resistance from the rank and file and is telling 
management not to go too fast. In this case, despite the serious efforts of management at 
decentralizing authority and problem-solving responsibilities, empowerment has largely 
been stalled due to resistance from the union rank and file. For three union elections in a 
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row, over six years, the union leadership lost to a contingent running on an obstructionist 
platform – against the entire initiative including nominally empowering changes such as 
teamwork and the opportunity to contribute ideas to continuous improvement. Each time 
the leadership “came around” to the partnership platform and only in the last election 
were they able to get reelected on the partnership platform. The President and VP of the 
union had just resigned, two days before my visit, because there was so much pressure 
from the floor.   
Complaints with the new system ran the gamut, even for those not dramatically 
affected by the pay and incentive changes. A common complaint was that management’s 
attempts at kaizen and substantive empowerment were experienced as disabling. One 
worker provides a typical summary, noting that in the kaizen events they  
 
have these brainstorms, where everything looks good on paper. And then they’ll set it up 
that way and then they’ll just leave. And then they’ll expect the people that are in that cell 
to make it work, but it’s like, you just give us half the stuff, you’re not there to see it all 
the way through to the end. ... And it’s like, you know, someone’s got to be out there all 
the time to make sure that it works ... they just like get you going and then they'll stop 
and then they’ll start another one ... you've got to see it through to the end, you know.  
 
This complaint was echoed by others, as workers were unable to resolve their role 
conflict, generated from not knowing how to balance and prioritize their new sets of 
responsibilities. As another worker commented  
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I think everything could work here if there was just better communication between 
management and the workers on the floor, you know. … We deal with this stuff every 
day. We know what the problems are. You know, it’s just, there’s too many little 
committees set up to fix a problem. … It seems like for a lot of companies nowadays, you 
know, I think that they worry about having meetings, they spend more time in meetings 
than they do doing anything else. 
 
Now, the teams of workers are supposed to actively take the responsibility to 
solve the problems on their own. It appears that there has been too much decentralization 
of authority and responsibility, and in any case some workers felt disabled or paralyzed 
when given the opportunity to engage in decision-making and problem-solving. 
Management did spend significant resources on training workers in kaizen – they have 
both an active kaizen program coordinator and separate training coordinator – including 
extensive work with a “trainer training” program. Yet many workers felt unprepared 
and/or unwilling to take the initiative to engage in problem-solving, independently 
initiating lateral communication with other workers and engineers, figuring out on their 
own how to “see it through to the end.” They are competent workers who are not ready to 
assume these expanded roles with their problem-solving and decision-making 
responsibilities. Thrusting them into these new roles before they were ready only 
increased worker resentment and resistance.   
 The attempts at substantive empowerment here were not only dysfunctional but 
also limited. Many of the problems discussed here were from workers in lower volume, 
higher variety cells that were harder to work the kinks out of. Another worker who 
worked in a high volume dedicated cell told a much different story: “We just follow the 
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schedule they set up … We don’t talk about it, we don’t decide nothing. Come in the 
morning, we just look at the board, what the lead, the line leader set up, just look at it, we 
go to it and start doing it.”  
The labor process and organizational structure at Industrial Pumps were quite 
different than at Custom, though they experienced similar problems with attempts at 
substantive empowerment. Though Industrial does not have online teams or regular 
production meetings that involve front-line workers, unlike the other nonunion shops I 
visited self-directed teams were at least on their radar. They once tried to institute online 
teams but it “blew up in their face” because they implemented them “on paper” without 
any training or support. The teams were instituted early in the restructuring process. 
Supervisors who were great at traditional responsibilities were not good at their new 
leadership role and there was not enough cross training. New team leaders were confused 
and unsure about goals and means, having many new responsibilities for larger systems 
and employee development. Now management is focusing on leadership and 
manufacturing training for their first-line supervisors.  
For now they have backed off deep and wide substantive empowerment, working 
instead on lean continuous improvement within a framework of largely nominal 
empowerment, with some limited opportunities for substantive participation. But the case 
of Industrial, who is considerably leaner than Tubefab or Integrated, shows how 
attempting even limited substantive empowerment in a nonunion environment is 
significantly harder to implement than nominal empowerment, as the elimination of 
hierarchy and specialization may generate ambiguity in goals and means leading to 
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negative effects that counteract or overwhelm any enabling consequences of participatory 
standardization.  
At Industrial, the question remains open whether they will move in the future to 
more extensive substantive empowerment with self-directed teams. In the end, what they 
will need to overcome most may be worker reticence. Industrial attempted too much, too 
quickly, attempting to restructure without sufficient attention to the importance of 
training and other forms of HR support. At Custom Seats, even though management was 
sensitive to training and HR support, they still encountered resistance and problems. It 
appears that they did not focus enough on ideological or cultural change (Vallas, 2003b) 
– which need not necessarily be domineering but may be also negotiated with workers9 – 
as many workers maintain an understanding of the situation in which they were not ready 
to accept what they consider managerial responsibilities.  
  
9. Discussion 
The data presented here are consistent with the contention of early critics that lean 
production can achieve substantial performance improvements through better process 
control and enlisting workers in standardization, but without necessarily improving the 
experience of workers through empowerment (Berggren, 1992; Dohse et al., 1985; 
Lewchuk and Robertson, 1997; Parker and Slaughter, 1995). My findings differ from 
these critics, however, in suggesting that lean production is not necessarily based on work 
intensification and more limited worker discretion. Rather, I find that in certain contexts 
there may be some increase in individual autonomy (Adler, 1995) and collective 
autonomy (Klein, 1991: 32), though as Hackman and Wageman (1995) suggest this is 
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limited to a subset of workers and situations. In contrast with a second critical position, a 
managerial focus on ideological or cultural control is not evident in my cases. However, 
such outcomes are not inconsistent with the data and theory presented here. Rather, the 
theory of organizational political economy emphasizes the role of local context in 
shaping managerial focus; in certain situations, such as the highly intense regime of an 
auto assembly plant with a history of adversarial relations (Graham, 1995), ideological 
control may be an important component of efforts at implementing lean production. 
My findings are consistent with, and I attempt to develop a third critical position, 
what I have called the intermediate position, which focuses on the reasons for selective 
adoption of lean practices and sees worker empowerment neither as a necessary 
component of, nor incompatible with lean production (Eaton, 1995; Helper, 1995). All of 
the firms I visited achieved significant performance improvements by implementing a 
package of lean practices including various mechanisms to increase worker input. For 
most workers, however, empowerment is nominal, involving a real, though slight 
difference from the traditional Taylorist model – workers are encouraged to give their 
input into the labor process – but trivial increase in workers’ power or control over the 
labor process. I have attempted to demonstrate that lean production with nominal 
empowerment can achieve significant performance improvements through better process 
control and increased flexibility. In short, managers may be satisfied with being lean 
enough without having to embark on a costlier and more uncertain path to becoming a 
world-class lean plant, which would require some degree of substantive empowerment of 
workers to engage systematic and relentless restructuring, and hence change in the social 
structure of the plant.  
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 In the six cases presented here, three outcomes regarding worker empowerment 
are found: lean enough with nominal empowerment; limited substantive empowerment, 
where there are some opportunities for substantive participation and increased decision-
making authority but these are limited in extent; and stalled (and limited) substantive 
empowerment, where attempts at substantive empowerment become problematic because 
of undisciplined implementation in a context of worker reticence and resistance. The 
theory of organizational political economy invoked to explain this pattern of variation 
focuses on how the strategic orientation of management (including the approach to 
implementation), organized worker power, and workforce disposition are shaped and 
modified by the characteristics of local plant politics, culture and history, including 
previous management initiatives, labor-management relations, informal agreements, and 
formal HR and other employment practices.  
Tubefab and Integrated Corp are clear cases of being lean enough with nominal 
empowerment. Management in each case was able to implement a different combination 
of lean practices with relative ease including offline teams at Tubefab, online and offline 
teams with highly detailed job classifications at Integrated. At both plants a one-time 
major physical reorganization took place that is now being marginally revised. 
Restructuring from a fragmented and high-waste Fordist past, these changes were enough 
for the plants to see considerable performance improvements. Workers had limited say in 
such changes and ultimately the actual content of their jobs changed little, other than 
some job rotation among similarly rote, standardized tasks. The negligible effects on job 
content combined with a lack of worker organization to produce a relatively compliant 
workforce, so that management has been able implement its technically-oriented version 
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of lean production largely as such. In both cases, local plant history has been relatively 
conducive to producing a workforce amenable to such technical changes, with Tubefab 
being the best employer in town regarding wages and security, and Integrated providing 
workers with training and good communication in addition to decent wages and good 
security.  
A key similarity shared by Tubefab and Integrated is that they have not focused in 
any systematic, determined way on what should be considered core lean metrics: 
reduction of lead times and machine setups.10 By exposing bottlenecks and other 
problems, reduction of lead times can drive all other lean metrics leading to more 
flexibility with less waste and superior quality (Ericksen and Suri, 2001; Suri, 1998). 
Instead of doggedly pursuing lead time reduction, these two plants focused on less 
dramatic technical changes and metrics with clear payoffs such as inventory reduction.  
Other plants that focused more systematically on lead time reduction also 
attempted to implement some substantive empowerment. This conjunction is not 
coincidental. It is what MacDuffie (MacDuffie, 1995a) is referring to when he argues that 
bundles of complementary practices are necessary to implement a world-class lean 
system, which is interdependent and fragile. Thus, Industrial Pumps, Second Tier 
Specialist, and Custom Seats, all of which systematically target lead time reduction 
throughout their entire shops, attempted to substantively empower parts of their 
workforces as a method to achieve this target.11 Here I agree with MacDuffie (1995a) 
that when the ability to deal with contingencies is transferred from the technical system to 
the HR system through an interdependent labor process of reduced buffers and 
heightened vulnerabilities, the best way to make the system function effectively is with 
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broadly skilled, substantively empowered workers. However, some of these plants 
backed off more than others, and while all attempted to strive beyond lean enough toward 
MacDuffie’s ideal, even in these cases such empowerment was limited in breadth.  
At Second Tier and Mini OE, substantive empowerment is limited because of the 
sheer complexity involved in actually transforming the social structure of the plant – 
including local politics and culture – into a durable institutional configuration of routines, 
practices and worldviews that can support extensive substantive empowerment. 
Additionally, substantive empowerment appears to be structurally limited because of the 
constraints of formalization and managerial prerogative. Standardized work still needs to 
be performed and multiple, pressing demands still need to be met, often under 
circumstances which are not conducive to deliberative co-management. Workers may 
have some control over their work process, and may have some opportunities for 
substantive participation, but these are still capitalist firms, with all their constraints, 
competing interests and worldviews. In both plants, management still retains prerogative 
over most organizational decisions and supervises team and continuous improvement 
initiatives, and there are still workers who greet the increased responsibilities of 
substantive empowerment with reticence or hostility (and other workers with largely 
unchanged routines). 
At Second Tier even relatively modest changes have been met with serious 
shopfloor resistance, due to a local union culture that values craft pride and highly 
individualized work. Worker experience with previously aborted managerial initiatives 
further contributed to this disposition. The rather unique circumstances at Mini OE, 
including lack of detailed job classifications in the union contract and low average tenure 
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in the shop made for a relatively reticent or amenable workforce. Further, management at 
Mini OE employs a slow, negotiated approach, including extensive training and well-
designed financial incentives. Also attuned to the culture and disposition of the 
workforce, Second Tier uses a relatively disciplined approach, though there are problems 
with the financial incentive structure of new arrangements and with lack of time to follow 
through on training promises. 
At Industrial Pumps and Custom Seats, substantive empowerment is not only 
limited but stalled. In both cases, problematic approaches to implementing substantive 
empowerment – trying to push too far too quickly – met with unprepared, reticent 
workers and, at Custom Seats, formidable worker resistance. At Industrial Pumps the 
problem stemmed largely from an attempt to force change too quickly, with a lack of 
training and insufficient support for expanded worker roles. At Custom Seats, in addition 
to problems with financial incentives there are deeper issues with worker attitudes and 
orientations (particularly in a union context where there are institutional mechanisms for 
protection and worker voice). Despite a moderate amount of training and communication, 
Custom Seats has not been sufficiently attentive to the culture and dispositions of 
significant parts of their workforce. This case demonstrates that even with a fair amount 
of training and communication about managerial goals and alleged new opportunities for 
workers, substantive empowerment can occur only where workers are ready to embrace 
it. The restructuring process must be negotiated and methodically implemented so that 
workers perceive some stakes in and ownership over new practices and routines.  
The experiences at Custom and Industrial demonstrate that substantive 
empowerment may not be associated with improved working conditions, but rather, by 
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broadening responsibilities and decision-making authority, may generate role conflict and 
stress and, as was particularly evident at Custom, eliminate individual autonomy in work 
pace. More generally, while the opportunity to give input into the work process may be 
welcome by many workers, and opportunities for participation in decision-making 
embraced by some, worker empowerment is not about improving the work experience as 
such, but about achieving managerial goals, usually within a neotaylorist framework. In 
all, these cases demonstrate that when management seeks to push beyond being lean 
enough to focus tenaciously on lead-time reduction and systematic continuous 
improvement, some degree of substantive empowerment and social change are necessary. 
Yet, there is no formula to implement substantial technical and social change in a 
uniform, structured and disciplined way. Rather management must be very attentive to 
workforce dispositions – what are the concerns, values, attitudes and orientations of the 
workers – and modify its approach accordingly. 
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Figure 1. Employer incentive structure for types of empowerment 
under different shopfloor governance structures 
           Nonunion shop                         Union shop 
 
Substantive 
empowerment 
(SE) 
Moderate-high cost: 
Complex social changes 
including altered authority 
structure; 
Uncertain marginal benefit 
 
Moderate-high cost: 
Complex technical and social change, but 
with already-altered authority structure and 
existing framework for power sharing; 
Uncertain marginal benefit 
 
Nominal 
empowerment 
(NE) 
Low cost: 
Straightforward technical 
changes;  
High marginal benefit 
 
Moderate-high cost: 
Even technical changes relatively complex, 
given contractual obligations and organized 
workforce; 
Uncertain marginal benefit 
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Table 1 
 Tubefab Integrated 
Blinds 
Mini OE Second 
Tier 
Specialist 
Industrial 
Pumps 
Custom 
Seats 
Main products Mufflers, 
air cleaners 
and filters 
Blinds 
(plastic and 
fabric), parts 
Wire 
wheels/ 
brushes 
Industrial 
cylinders 
Industrial 
pumps 
Leather and 
vinyl seats 
Processes Stamping, 
bending, 
painting, 
assembly 
Injection 
molding, 
extrusion, 
stamping, 
assembly 
Assembly Machining, 
assembly 
Machining, 
assembly 
High skill 
sewing and 
upholstery, 
assembly 
Employees 150 direct  1000 105 100 82 220 direct 
Ownership Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
       
Lean       
     Inventory 
     reduction 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     JIT delivery Yes Some No Yes Yes Yes 
     Make to 
     demand 
Yes Some No Yes Yes Yes 
     Continuous 
     flow/Cellular 
     production 
Tube 
fabrication 
Some Yes Yes Assembly Yes 
     Functional 
     layout    
Press 
department  
Largely No No Machining No 
     Standardiza- 
     tion 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Worker 
participation 
      
     Hierarchical 
     management 
High High Low Low Medium Medium 
     On-line 
     Teams 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
         Self- 
         directed 
No No Planned Planned Planned Planned 
     Off-line 
     Teams 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Ad hoc Yes  
     Kaizen Periodic, 
consultative  
Periodic, 
consultative 
Planned Extensive, 
substantive 
Moderate, 
substantive 
Extensive, 
substantive 
     Labor-mgt. 
     committee 
No No Yes Yes No Yes 
       
Union No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Workforce 
disposition 
Amenable 
or reticent 
Amenable or 
reticent 
Amenable 
or reticent 
Resistant, 
enthusiastic, 
or reticent 
Reticent, 
amenable, 
or 
enthusiastic 
Resistant, 
enthusiastic, 
or reticent 
Worker 
empowerment 
Nominal Nominal Limited 
substantive 
Limited 
substantive 
Stalled and 
limited 
substantive 
Stalled and 
limited 
substantive 
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